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Abstract: In quantitative risk analysis usually generic hypothesis concerning the loss of 
containment initiating events are applied, in order to simplify the analysis. For example, for 
the loss of containment from a storage tank: instantaneous release of the complete inventory, 
continuous release of the complete inventory in 10 min and continuous release from a hole 
with a diameter of 10 mm. Once these initiating events specified, it is necessary to develop 
the corresponding event trees to establish which are the different sequences –depending on 
the properties of the released material, the existing safety barriers, etc.– leading from each 
initiating event to the diverse final outcomes or accident scenarios. In this communication a 
set of generic short event trees are proposed for the main cases which can be found, as a 
function of the type of hazardous material released. Values for the corresponding 
intermediate probabilities (immediate ignition, delayed ignition, flame front acceleration, 
BLEVE, etc.) are also proposed, following both a literature survey and expert judgment. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
After a loss of containment event (the collapse of a tank, a hole in a pipe, etc.) takes place, the incident can follow 
diverse sequences depending on the circumstances: the properties and condition of the released material, the 
existence of one or more safety barriers, etc. Each one of these sequences will lead to a final accidental scenario 
with a severity which will range between “no outcome” (no consequences or negligible consequences) and a major 
accident such as an explosion, a large fire, etc.  
 
When the quantitative risk analysis of a given plant is performed, usually generic hypothesis concerning the 
initiating events to be taken into account are applied. Thus, for example, for the loss of containment from a storage 
tank the following three loss of containment events are considered: instantaneous release of the complete inventory, 
continuous release of the complete inventory in 10 min and continuous release from a hole with a diameter of 10 
mm (each one with the corresponding associated frequency). Then, following each initiating event, the incident can 
evolve in different ways; therefore, the corresponding event trees must be constructed to know the diverse final 
outcomes or accident scenarios, and b) the frequencies associated to each one of these final scenarios. 
 
In the same way that generic hypothesis on the initiating events are assumed, generic event trees following these 
events can also be assumed for the most frequent cases, as a function of the type of hazardous material involved. 
The inclusion in these events trees of the intermediate probabilities associated to the diverse circumstances or safety 
barriers (immediate ignition, delayed ignition, flame front acceleration, BLEVE, etc.) will allow establishing the 
frequencies expected for the different outcomes or accidental scenarios. This will help in performing systematic 
quantitative risk analysis. Of course, if a specific risk analysis must be performed on a given unit, specific initiating 
loss of containment events and events trees should be better considered, but for ordinary analysis the aforementioned 
approach would be a useful tool.  
 
In this communication a set of generic short event trees are proposed for the main cases which can be found, as a 
function of the type of hazardous material released. Values for the corresponding intermediate probabilities are also 
proposed, following both a literature survey and expert judgment. Examples of petroleum fractions or representative 
chemicals are included for each tree. 
 
2. PROPOSED EVENT TREES 
 
2.1. Flammable, low volatility liquid materials 
 
For example, kerosene or chemicals with 21≤ Tf ≤ 55 ºC at room temperature, equivalent to R10 flammable 
substances (according to EC labeling directives). The following event tree should be considered: 
 
 
Initiating event Ignition   Final scenario 
     
 Yes   Pool fire 
 
Liquid spill 
P1 = 0.01    
f     
 No   No consequences 
 P1= 0.99    
 
 
    
For substances with Tf > 55 ºC the ignition probability is very low, and usually it is not considered in QRA studies. 
In some cases, if Tf  is close to 55 ºC (i.e. diesel oil) the same ignition probability can be considered: P1 = 1%. 
Delayed ignition is neglected because, due to the low volatility, flammable clouds are not generated (Ronza et al., 
2007). 
 
2.2. Toxic and flammable, low volatility liquid materials 
 
For example, allyl alcohol (at room temperature).  This event tree for toxics is not used in a regular manner, and 
often it can be neglected in QRA analysis. 
 
 
Initiating event Ignition   Final scenario 
     
 Yes   Pool fire  
 
Liquid spill 
P1 = 0.01    
F     
 No   Toxic dispersion 
 P1 = 0.99    
 
Flammability features and ignition probability: same values than for case 2.1.  
 
2.3. Flammable and volatile liquid materials 
 
For example, gasoline or naphtha or chemicals with Tf ≤ 21 ºC at room temperature, equivalent to R11 flammable 
substances (according to EC labeling directives). 
In the event of delayed ignition a flash fire or explosion can occur. In general, after the ignition, the flame will run 
back to the liquid pool and give rise to a pool fire. In some cases, due to congestion or to the large size of the 
flammable cloud, flame front acceleration can occur and the explosion scenario must be included. 
 
 
Initiating event Immediate ignition Delayed ignition Flame front acceleration Final scenario 
     
 Yes   Pool Fire 
 P1 = 0.0651    
   Yes Explosion 
Liquid spill   Yes
P3 = 0.43  
f  P2 = 14 
 
  
 No  No Flash Fire + Pool Fire  
 P1 = 0.935  3P  = 0.6  
  No  No consequences 
  
2P    
 
 
1: Probability of immediate ignition taken from Bevi (2009) for highly flammable substances (Tf < 21 ºC). 
2: Default probability of delayed ignition (flammable vapor). 
3: Probability of explosion in the event of flammable dispersion (Bevi, 2009), only if a minimum amount (usually 
500 - 1000 kg)  is between flammability limits in the cloud. If this criterion it is not fulfilled, use P3 = 0 
4: The criterion of 100% for the probability of delayed ignition is probably too conservative, as not always the 
release of these substances gives rise to a fire. The following values are therefore proposed: 
 
 
Table 1 
Probability If LFL exceeds the establishment boundary* Process releases** 
Process releases in 
classified areas without 
any direct ignition sources 
Storage 
releases*** 
P2 1 0.7 0.1 0.07 
2P  0 0.3 0.9 0.93 
*From the Purple Book (2007). 
**The highest value of Bevi (2009) as it is a zone with possible ignition sources. 
***A low value is applied, being a zone without any direct ignition sources (Ronza et al, 2007). 
 
 
Of course, a more accurate method can also be applied by considering the actual ignition sources and estimating the 
probability of delayed ignition as a function of the probability of ignition of each source and the probability that they 
be reached by the flammable cloud. 
 
2.4. Toxic and flammable, volatile liquid materials 
 
For example, benzene or acrylontrile at room temperature. Event tree, flammability features and ignition 
probabilities: same values than in case 2.3. A significant difference: the “no ignition” branch must include the toxic 
dispersion outcome. 
 
It should be noted that if the probability of delayed ignition is considered to be 100%, the toxic dispersion scenario 
is eliminated. In Bevi (2009), for toxic and flammable vapors the following criterion is proposed; the frequency of 
escape f is divided into two separate events: 
- a purely flammable event (pool fire) when direct ignition occurs 
- a purely toxic event (toxic dispersion) when there is not any direct ignition. 
 
This criterion leads to the following practical event tree (not including vapor cloud explosion): 
 
 
Initiating event Immediate ignition Final scenario 
    
 Yes  Pool fire 
 P1 = 0.0651 
Liquid spill    
f No  Toxic dispersion 
 P1 = 0.935   
 
 
This implies that if there is no immediate ignition, toxic atmospheric dispersion should be always assumed. This is a 
very conservative approach. In fact a flash fire can occur if an ignition source is reached. The suggested approach 
considers only toxic dispersion because larger distances are expected. Toxic effects after ignition of the flammable 
cloud are not included. It is assumed that in this case the plume will rise and will not cause any further lethal toxic 
effects at ground level. 
 
 
2.5. Continuous releases of extremely flammable pressurized liquefied gases 
 
For example, liquefied propane or butane and chemicals with R12 phrase (“extremely flammable”) according to EC 
Directives (i.e. methyl chloride), at room temperature (see figure). 
 
 
Initiating event Immediate ignition Delayed ignition Flame front acceleration Final scenario 
     
Pool Fire (low momentum releases) 
 Yes   Jet Fire (high momentum releases) 
 P1 = 0.2, 0.5, 0.71    
   Yes Explosion 
Two-phase release   Yes 
P3 = 0.43 
 
 
f  P2 = 12 
 
  
 No  No Flash Fire + Pool Fire  
 P1 = 0.8, 0.5, 0.3  3P  = 0.6  
  No  No consequences 
  
2P  = 0   
 
 
1: Probability of immediate ignition of flammable gases, depending on the released flow rate m (Bevi, 2009): 0.2 if 
m < 10 kg s-1; 0.5 if 10 < m < 100 kg s-1; 0.7 if m > 100 kg s-1. 
2: Default probability of delayed ignition (flammable vapour). For these substances P2 = 1 because the possibilities 
of intervention in the event of a flammable cloud are very small. In some cases this assumption may be too 
conservative (Ronza et al, 2007). Probabilities given in 2.3 can also be used as alternative. 
3: Probability of explosion in the event of flammable dispersion (Bevi, 2009), only if a minimum amount (usually 
500 - 1000 kg) is between flammability limits in the cloud. If this criterion it is not fulfilled, use P3 = 0. 
 
The final scenario for immediate ignition will be usually a Jet Fire for high momentum free jet releases (horizontal 
or upwards). For an obstructed or downward two-phase release, a Pool Fire may be the most representative scenario. 
 
 
2.6. Instantaneous releases of extremely flammable pressurized liquefied gases 
 
For example, same as 2.5 case, but instantaneous. 
 
 
Initiating event Immediate ignition BLEVE Delayed ignition Flame front acceleration Final scenario 
      
  Yes   Fireball (BLEVE) 
 Yes 
P2 = 0.71    
 
 P1 = 0.2, 0,., 0.72   Yes Explosion 
  No  P4 = 0.43  
  2P  = 0.3    
Liquid spill/aerosol release    No Cloud Fire 
f    
4P  = 0.6 (cloud combustion) 
      
    Yes Explosion 
   Yes P4 = 0.43  
   P3 = 1   
 No   No Flash Fire 
 P1 = 0.8, 0.5, 0.3   4P  = 0.6  
   No  No consequences 
   
3P  = 0   
 
1: Probability of immediate ignition depending on the released amount m (Bevi, 2009): 0.2 if m < 1,000 kg; 0.5 if 
1,000 < m < 10,000 kg; 0,7 if m > 10,000 kg. 
2: Probability of occurrence of a BLEVE immediate ignition of an instantaneous spill (Bevi, 2009) 
3: Default probability of delayed ignition (flammable vapour). For these substances P2 = 1 because the possibilities 
of intervention in the event of a flammable cloud are very small. In some cases this assumption may be too 
conservative (Ronza et al, 2007). Probabilities given in 2.3 can also be used as an alternative. 
4: Probability of explosion in the event of flammable dispersion (Bevi, 2009), only if a minimum amount (usually 
500 - 1000 kg) is between flammability limits in the cloud. If this criterion it is not fulfilled, use P3 = 0. 
 
Cloud Fire (a flammable cloud burning with not previous dispersion) could be simulated, as a conservative case, 
using a fireball model. 
 
2.7. Releases of cryogenic or fully refrigerated flammable liquids 
 
For example liquefied ethylene, LNG stored close to normal boiling point or ethylene oxide fully refrigerated. 
Initiating event Immediate ignition Delayed ignition Flame front acceleration Final scenario 
     
 Yes   Pool fire 
 P1 = 0.2, 0.5, 0.71    
   Yes Explosion 
Liquid spill  Yes 
P3 = 0.43
 
 
f  P2 = 12
 
  
 
No 
 No Flash fire + Pool 
fire 
 P1 = 0.8, 0.5, 0.3  3P  = 0.6  
  No  No consequences 
  
2P  = 0   
 
1: Probability of ignition of flammable gases, depending on the released amount/flow rate (Bevi, 2009).  
2: Default probability of delayed ignition (flammable vapour). Probabilities given in 2.3 can also be used. 
3: Probability of explosion in case of flammable atmospheric dispersion. 
 
Some significant exceptions should be considered; for example, LNG in open terrain does not explode and P3 = 0. 
 
 
2.8. Flammable gases 
 
For example, hydrogen or compressed ethylene or natural gas (at room temperature). 
 
Initiating event Ignitio   Final accident 
     
 Yes   Jet fire  
 
Gas release 
P1 = 0.2, 0.5, 0.71  
f     
 No   No consequences 
 P1 = 0.8, 0.5, 0.3  
     
 
1: Probability of ignition of flammable gases, depending on the released amount/flow rate (Bevi, 2009). 
 
The possibility of explosion is neglected, due to the quick dispersion in the case of high momentum jet releases. 
 
2.9. Toxic and flammable gases 
 
For example, hydrogen sulphide. Two possibilities: 
 
 
Initiating event  
Ignition 
   
Final accident 
     
 Yes   Jet Fire 
 
Gas release 
P1 = 0.2, 0.5, 0.71  
f     
 No   Toxic dispersion 
 P1 = 0.8, 0.5, 0.3  
1: Probability of ignition of flammable gases, depending on the released amount/flow rate (Bevi, 2009). 
2.10. Toxic gases 
 
As, for example chlorine (gas). Only one possibility: 
 
 
Initiating event    Final accident 
     
Gas release   Toxic dispersion 
f   
 
 
2.11. Toxic liquids 
 
For example, toluene di-isocyanate or dimethyl sulphate. 
 
Initiating event    Final accident 
     
Liquid spill   Toxic dispersion 
f   
 
2.12. Continuous releases of toxic and extremely flammable pressurized liquefied gases 
 
For example, ethylene oxide (stored as liquid close to room temperature). 
 
Event tree, flammability features and ignition probabilities: same values than in case 2.5. There is only a significant 
difference: the “no ignition” branch must include the toxic dispersion outcome. Again, a problem arises due to the 
fact that if a probability of 1 is assumed for “delayed ignition”, the scenario of toxic dispersion is eliminated. The 
following event tree can be used as a conservative approach: 
 
 
Initiating event Immediate ignition Final scenario 
   
Pool Fire (low momentum releases) 
 Yes Jet Fire (high momentum releases) 
 
P1 = 0.2, 0.5, 0.71  
 
Liquid spill   
f   
 No Toxic dispersion 
 P1 = 0.8, 0.5, 0.3  
 
1: Probability of immediate ignition of flammable gases, depending on the released flow rate (Bevi, 2009). 
 
 
2.13. Instantaneous releases of toxic and flammable liquefied substances 
 
For example, ethylene oxide (stored as liquid close to room temperature). 
 
Event tree, flammability features and ignition probabilities: same values than in case 2.6. There is only a significant 
difference: the “no ignition” branch must include the toxic dispersion outcome. 
 
Again, if the probability of delayed ignition is taken as 1, the toxic dispersion scenario is eliminated. Thus, the Bevi 
(2009) event tree for continuous releases may be used. 
Initiating event Immediate ignition BLEVE Flame front acceleration Final scenario 
     
  Yes  Fireball (BLEVE) 
 Yes 
P2 = 0.71   
 
 P1 = 0.2, 0.5, 0.72  Yes Explosion 
  No P4 = 0.43  
  2P  = 0.3   
Liquid spill – aerosol release   No Cloud Fire 
f   
4P  = 0.6 (cloud combustion) 
     
 No   Toxic dispersion 
 P1 = 0.8, 0.5, 0.3    
 
 
3. DISCUSSION 
 
The proposed set of event trees considering flammability, volatility and toxicity can be summarized in a table: 
 
Flammability 
features 
Volatibility features Acute 
toxicity? 
Event tree nº Hydrocarbon example/s Chemical example/s 
Flammable 
Gas 
yes 2.9 --- Hydrogen sulphide 
no 2.8 Compressed natural gas  or ethylene Hydrogen 
Cryogenic or fully 
refrigerated liquid 
yes  (see Note) --- --- 
no 2.7 LNG, refrigerated  liquid ethylene 
Refrigerated  
ethylene oxide 
Pressurized liquefied gas yes 2.12, 2.13 --- Ethylene oxide no 2.5, 2.6 Butane, propane Methyl chloride 
Volatile liquid yes 2.4 Benzene Acrylonitrile no 2.3 Naphta, gasoline R11 substance 
Low volatility liquid yes 2.2 --- Allyl alcohol no 2.1 Kerosene, diesel R10 substance 
Non 
flammable or 
low reactivity 
flammable gas 
Gas yes 2.10 --- Ammonia (g) 
Liquid yes 2.11 --- Toluene di-isocyanate, dimethyl sulfate 
Note : Not considered in this study. Refrigerated ammonia can be a candidate for this case, but not using the standard ignition 
probabilities considered for hydrocarbon o regular flammable substances. 
 
This set of event trees show the basic scheme for the evolution of the accident in the event of a loss of containment, 
as a function of the type of material released. For a given case, i.e. for the analysis of a given unit or plant, the 
eventual intermediate events –corresponding, for example, to the existence of mitigation systems, flow interruption, 
etc.– should be added.  
 
All these event trees are proposed for materials at room temperature or refrigerated/cryogenic. If scenarios in 
process units are considered, hotter releases could occur. In each case the release condition should be evaluated in 
order to decide which event tree can be applied; for example, hot gasoline under pressure should be considered as 
LPG (when released, will undergo a flash vaporization). 
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